





Narrative as a Means of Creating an Identity 
for Ourselves and Others
Abstract
The need to narrate is according to P. Ricœur the very core of creating the knowledge of self. 
The process of identification through narration does not lead us to be focused on our own 
narration. We always find other people’s narrations first and then start telling the narra-
tion of our life. Through narration, as understood by Ricœur, we can simultaneously learn 
ethics as well as morals. To show this the author compares philosophic view of identity by 
Ricœur with Frisch’s literary experiment in the novel I’m	Not	Stiller. Both of them are a 
hermeneutic intertwining that brings to natural identity. In this hermeneutic process we can 
rediscover ourselves in a world, in which we will respect our own identity by being fully 



































ries	 and	 be	 open	 to	 differences,	 otherness	 of	 the	 outside,	 in	 order	 to	 even	











1. Hermeneutic way to identity















































































ped	 Ricœur	 a	 lot	 on	 his	 hermeneutic	 path,	
with	 his	 positive	 attitude	 to	 tradition,	 preju-
dices,	 and	 intertwining	of	different	 interpre-
tations.	However,	“Gadamer’s	hermeneutics,	
in	 its	 radical	 critique	 of	 critique	 continues	
Dilthey’s	 dichotomy	 between	 understanding	


















does	not	consider	 the	 inner	experience	of	 the	 individual.	Therefore	we	can	
say	that	in	the	process	of	creating	the	identity	from	the	outside,	the	question	








































































on	 this	 foundation.	 Stiller,	who	 goes	 by	 the	
name	Jim	White,	 is	 identified	by	his	 appea-





you’re	bound	 to	know	all	about	 it,	 and	 they	
themselves	only	have	a	 rough	 idea.”	 (Frisch	
2006,	12)	The	plot	of	the	novel	is	in	the	fact	







self-transparency	 is	a	quest	 that	 is	caught	 in	
an	infinite	regress,	where	the	question	‘Who	
is	conscious	of	consciousness?’	can	never	be	
answered.	A	metaphysical	 ‘ground	 that	 gro-
unds	 itself’	 is	 forever	 out	 of	 reach.	 Hence,	
Ricœur	transforms	reflection	by	way	of	a	her-
meneutical	 variation	of	 phenomenology,	 not	






Stiller’s	change	or	 return	 to	his	old	 identity,	
meant	 the	 end	 of	 attempts	 to	 create	 a	 new	
identity.	 Public	 prosecutor,	 now	 already	 as	
a	 friend,	 is	 thinking	 during	 the	 visit	 of	 the	
pottery	workshop,	which	is	what,	in	the	end,	




had	 spoken	 only	 of	 himself	when	 he	 talked	
about	 marriage	 in	 general,	 about	 Negroes,	
volcanoes,	and	heaven	knows	what	else:	now	








basis	of	 the	hermeneutic	process	of	searching	for	 identity	of	an	 individual.	
At	 the	 same	 time	he	doesn’t	 deny	 that	 the	 starting	 challenge	 is	 a	 classical	
infallible	and	enlightened	subject	–	cogito	which	derives	 from	rationalistic	






stemological	 (and	 ontological,	 as	 I	 shall	 state	 in	 the	 tenth	 study)	 place,	 situated	 beyond	 the	
alternative	of	the	cogito	and	the	anti-cogito?”	(Ricœur	1992,	16)


















knowledgment	of	 temporal	dimension	of	 an	 individual,	 because	 it	 remains	
static.	It	also	remains	more	connected	with	a	third	person	that	we	talk	about,	
and	which	does	not	talk	by	itself;	through	this	it	determines	itself,	and	takes	














is	about	similarity	and	 is	 the	opposite	of	difference.	 If	 two	persons	are	ex-














The	character	is	not	 just	static;	 it	 includes	the	time	dimension	and	thus	the	
dynamisms	of	the	image.
4. From sameness to selfhood
If	a	character	is	the	foundation	for	sameness	and	we	can	use	this	in	reference	
to	other	beings,	we	have	to	find	something	that	 is	specific	to	determining	a	
human	 identity.	To	Ricœur,	 the	 base	 for	maintaining	 a	 “human”	 identity	 is	
the	ability	 to	keep	our	promise,	 faithfulness,	and	self-constancy.	 In	contrast	



























loved	 person.	 Stiller	 felt	 this	 need	 of	 loyal-
ty	to	somebody,	a	loved	person,	as	a	burden	
that	is	destroying	his	life,	and	that	is	why	he	
‘fled’.	Of	 course	not	 from	himself	but	 from	
the	world	 that	was	burdening	him.	Frisch	 is	














































































































well	as	Aristotle	and	 from	 it	 the	deontology	
of	Kant.	First	is	a	desire,	a	goal,	and	from	it	













even	 accept	 his	 beloved	 person,	 his	 wife,	
in	 her	 uniqueness.	 The	 public	 prosecutor	 is	
thinking	 at	 the	 end:	 “That	was	 exactly	 how	
she	lay	on	the	deathbed,	and	I	suddenly	had	
the	monstrous	feeling	that	from	the	very	be-
ginning	 Stiller	 had	 only	 seen	 her	 as	 a	 dead	
woman;	for	the	first	time,	too,	I	felt	the	deep	





on	 is	 grafted	 that	 of	 idem and	 ipse.	 Finally,	
the	dialectic	of	the	same	and	the	other	crowns	



































































it	 represents	 a	 boundary	 to	 him	 also,	which	 again	 points	 to	 character	 –	 to	
be	satisfied	with	how	I	am	perceived	by	the	world.	He	would	close	himself	
in	a	prison	of	an	image	that	never	existed.	In	the	process	of	narration	he	is	



















Ricœur	 and	Frisch’s	 answers	meet	 here.	 It	 is	 only	 possible	 to	maintain	 an	
identity	if	we	are	capable	to	develop	selfhood	in	sameness.	We	are	only	ca-
















































Evans,	Jeanne.	1995.	Paul Ricœur’s Hermeneutics of the Imagination. New	York:	Peter	Lang.
Frisch,	Max.	2006.	I’m Not Stiller. Rochester:	Dalkey	Archive	Press.
Reagan,	Charles	E.	 1996.	Paul Ricœur. His Life and His Work.	 Chicago–London:	The	
University	of	Chicago	Press.
Ricœur,	Paul.	1955.	La	parole	est	mon	royaume.	In:	Esprit	23:	192–205.
Ricœur,	Paul.	1965.	Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary.	Evanston:	
Northwestern	University	Press.
Ricœur,	Paul.	1965a.	Fallible Man.	Chicago:	Henry	Regnery.
Ricœur,	Paul.	1967.	Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology.	Evanston:	Northwestern	
University	Press.
Ricœur,	Paul.	1970.	Freud and Philosophy.	New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press.
Ricœur,	Paul.	1974.	The Conflict of Interpretations. Evanston:	Northwestern	University	Press.
Ricœur,	Paul.	1978.	My	Relation	to	the	History	of	Philosophy.	In:	Iliff Review 35:	5–12.
Ricœur,	Paul.	1984.	Time and Narrative I. Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press.




Narativ kao sredstvo kreiranja identiteta 
za nas i druge
Sažetak
Potreba za pripovijedanjem ne samo da je stvorila epske poeme i brojne mitologije nego je, 
prema P. Ricœuru, sama jezgra stvaranja znanja o sebi. Proces identifikacije kroz naraciju ne 
navodi nas na usredotočenost na našu vlastitu naraciju. Mi uvijek prvenstveno nailazimo na 
naracije drugih ljudi i tek onda počinjemo pričati našu životnu priču. Kroz proces imitacije, 
mimesisa, kako ga shvaća Ricœur, mi istodobno možemo učiti kako etiku tako i moral. Globalni 
svijet sa svojim pojednostavljenim naracijama tržišta nastoji ostati pri prvoj i drugoj mimezi te 
ne može pristupiti trećoj, tek u kojoj možemo početi govoriti o kreativnosti. Autor uspoređuje 
Ricœurove filozofske nazore o identitetu s Frischovim literarnim eksperimentom u djelu I’m	Not	
Stiller. Oba su primjer hermeneutičkog preplitanja koje dovodi do prirodnog identiteta. U ovom 
se hermeneutičkom procesu možemo ponovno pronaći u svijetu u kojem ćemo poštivati vlastiti 








Narrativ als Mittel der Identitätsschaffung 
für uns selbst und andere
Zusammenfassung
Das Bedürfnis nach Narration schuf nicht lediglich epische Gedichte und ungezählte Mytho-
logien, sondern repräsentiert P. Ricœur zufolge den wahren Kern der Wissensbildung über das 
Selbst. Der Identifikationsprozess durch das Erzählen lenkt uns nicht zum Fokus auf unsere 
eigene Narration. Andauernd wählen wir zunächst Erzählungen anderer Menschen aus und 
setzen erst hinterher mit eigener Lebensgeschichte ein. Durch den Prozess der Nachahmung, 
Mimesis – wie von Ricœur angesehen – sind wir imstande, zeitgleich sowohl Ethik als auch 
Moral zu erlernen. Die globale Welt mit ihren simplifizierten Narrationen des Marktes neigt 
dazu, bei der ersten und zweiten Mimesis zu verharren und ist außerstande, zur dritten überzu-
wechseln, wo erst die Rede von der Kreativität anfangen kann. Der Autor parallelisiert Ricœurs 
philosophischen Identitätsbegriff mit Frischs literarischem Experiment im Roman Stiller. Beide 
sind Exempel hermeneutischer Verflechtung, die zur natürlichen Identität führt. In diesem her-
meneutischen Ablauf vermögen wir, uns selbst wieder zu entdecken in einer Welt, in welcher 





Le récit comme moyen de créer une identité 
pour nous-mêmes et les autres
Résumé
Le besoin de narrer a non seulement créé des poèmes épiques et de nombreuses mythologies, 
il est, selon P. Ricœur, le noyau même de la création de la connaissance de soi. Le processus 
d’identification à travers la narration ne nous amène pas à nous focaliser sur notre propre 
narration. Nous rencontrons toujours d’abord les narrations des autres puis commençons seu-
lement à raconter l’histoire de notre vie. À travers le processus d’imitation, la mimesis, com-
me l’entend Ricœur, nous pouvons en même temps apprendre tant l’éthique que la morale. Le 
monde global, avec ses narrations simplifiées du marché, tente de rester proche de la première 
et la deuxième mimesis et ne peut accéder à la troisième, à partir de laquelle seulement on 
peut commencer à parler de créativité. L’auteur compare les points de vue philosophiques de 
Ricœur sur l’identité à l’expérience littéraire de Frisch dans l’ouvrage Je	ne	suis	pas	Stiller. Les 
deux sont l’exemple d’un entrelacement herméneutique qui mène à l’identité naturelle. Dans ce 
processus herméneutique, nous pouvons nous redécouvrir dans un monde où nous respecterons 
notre propre identité en étant ouverts à ses transformations créatives.
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